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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are listed in the caption. 
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IV, 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this 
appeal under Utah Code Ann, S 78-2a-2(k) . The judgment was entered 
on July 29, 1993. Chanhmany*s motion for a new trial was filed on 
July 30, 1993 and denied on November 1, 1993. She filed her Notice 
of Appeal on November 26, 1993. On January 24, 1994, the Utah 
Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Should this Court uphold a jury award of special 
damages in an amount for less than that established by the uncon-
troverted evidence? 
2. Did the lower court err in denying Chanhmany a new 
trial or additur when the jury awarded less than the amount estab-
lished by uncontradicted evidence for necessary medical expenses? 
3. Is Chanhmany entitled to a general damage award if 
there is uncontested evidence to support a special damage award 
exceeding $3,000 in medical expenses, but the jury chooses to award 
a lesser amount? 
4. Was the jury influenced by passion or prejudice? 
5. Can a trial court strike a general damages award if 
there is uncontradicted evidence of permanent disability and 
impairment, and the Court does not present the issue to the jury? 
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6. Did the lower court deny Chanhmany her right to a 
jury trial when it concluded Chanhmany was permanently disabled so 
it did not present the issue to the jury, but subsequently struck 
the general damages award which requires a conclusion that Chan-
hmany was not permanently disabled? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of Review for a decision denying a motion 
for a new trial based on Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) 
and/or (6) was articulated in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). It is the responsibility of the trial 
court to review the amount of the award to insure the jury has 
acted within its proper bounds. If the trial court can reasonably 
conclude that there was insufficient evidence to justify the 
verdict or that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the 
evidence, or that the jury acted with passion or prejudice, it may 
grant the motion and order a new trial. Crookston, supra at 804. 
In reviewing the judge's ultimate decision denying a new trial, the 
appellate court reverses if there is no reasonable basis for the 
lower court's decision. Crookston, supra at 805. 
Issues (3) and (5) require an interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-309. Thereafter they are questions of law and 
reviewed with no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial 
court. See e.g., Matter of Estate of Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169, 1171 
(Utah 1991); Ward v. Richfield Citv, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990); 
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Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp, 828 P. 2d 1071, 1072 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
The issue of whether an appellant has been denied the 
right to a jury trial guaranteed by Utah Const, art. I, § 10 is 
also a question of law. See. International Harvester Credit Corp. 
v. Pioneer Tractor and Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981). 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
The determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
ordinances are: 
Utah Const, art. I, § 10; 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307; 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-22-309; 
H.B. 15 (passed 2/4/94); 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(5) and (6). 
Copies are set forth in the addendum to this brief. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on a jury 
verdict in the Third Judicial District Court and a subsequent order 
denying Chanhmany's Motion for an Additur and/or a New Trial. 
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B. Course of Proceedings. 
This is an automobile accident case. The jury awarded 
$3,000 in general damages. The jury also awarded $2,100 in special 
damages as compensation for medical expenses even though the 
uncontradicted evidence established medical expenses of at least 
$3,299.09. Although the Court asked the jury to award damages to 
Chanhmany for her medical expenses, it did not ask the jury to 
determine whether Chanhmany met the threshold requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(1) (e). Moreover, the Court did not ask the 
jury to decide whether Chanhmany was permanently disabled. 
Subsequently, the lower court denied Chanhmany's Motion for an 
Additur or Alternatively a New Trial. The Court also struck the 
jury's $3,000 general damage award. Chanhmany timely appealed the 
judgment and subsequent Order of the lower court. 
C. Statement of the Facts. 
Chanhmany is a young Laotian woman injured in an auto-
mobile accident on July 22, 1989. (R. 2-8). She had no prior 
history of neck, shoulder or back pain. (Transcript of 
Proceedings, April 27-29, 1993, pp. 72, 76, 135 [hereinafter "Tr. 
p. "])• She was lawfully stopped at a red light near the 
intersection of 3300 South and 300 East when struck by a car driven 
by Brian Bone. (Tr. pp. 65-67) . Bone was involved in an immediate 
prior collision with a car driven by Joyce Preston. (R. 2-8; Tr. 
4 
pp. 66, 67, 309-311, 314; Tr. Exs. P-10, P-ll). A diagram 
illustrating the accident is set forth below: 
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Immediately after the accident, she was transported by 
ambulance to Holy Cross Hospital for treatment. At the hospital, 
Chanhmany complained of neck pain. (Tr. p. 154; Tr. Ex. D-15) . The 
hospital x-rayed her back, neck and shoulder. (Tr. p. 70; Tr. Ex. 
D-15). The hospital also gave her a neck brace. (Tr. p. 70). 
For two to four days, her neck, shoulder and back hurt. 
(Tr. p. 71) . Her "foster mother" took her to see Dr. Gary Whitley, 
a chiropractor. (Tr. p. 71). She complained of pain in her neck, 
shoulder and lower back. (Tr. p. 72) . Whitley treated her from 
July 26, 1989 to February of 1991. Chanhmany ceased treatment 
because she could not compensate Whitley. (Tr. p. 355). Dr. 
Whitley treated Chanhmany's injuries with heat, soft tissue 
massage, spinal manipulations, ultrasound, electrical stimulation, 
a neck brace and back brace. (Tr. pp. 71, 129, 130). Chanhmany 
testified that the treatments were helpful. (Tr. p. 72). 
Chanhmany was also examined by an orthopedic specialist at FHP, and 
on his recommendation received physical therapy at FHP. (Tr. pp. 
74, 75, 99-100; Trial Ex. P-3). 
As a result of the accident, Chanhmany1s truck was 
heavily damaged. She received $1,680 for repairs. (Tr. p. 69). 
In addition, she missed five (5) days of vacation and at least two 
(2) days of work. (Tr. pp. 80, 81, 242-243, 259; Trial Ex. P-22). 
Chanhmany's neck pain ended after treatment. However, 
she still experiences sharp back pain 3-4 times a week, numbness in 
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her shoulder, and she occasionally wears the back brace. (Tr. pp. 
74, 75, 78). 
Chanhmany has trouble lifting things at work. Her co-
workers must help her lift 50 lb. boxes. (Tr. pp. 76, 77, 260). 
She also has difficulty lifting laundry and groceries. (Tr. pp. 73, 
77). She can no longer participate in sports. (Tr. p. 79). 
Exercises are difficult; she cannot do sit ups. (Tr. p. 78). Her 
neck, shoulder and back range of motions are restricted. (Tr. pp. 
148, 149). 
Chanhmany sued both Bone and Preston. (R. 2-8) . She 
claimed that one or both of them was 100 percent at fault for the 
collision since Chanhmany's car was struck while lawfully stopped 
for the light. (Id,.) At trial two of the jurors expressed a bias 
against chiropractors. 
THE COURT: Do any of you oppose going to a 
chiropractor for treatment, have any 
strong feelings about going to — . 
We have two. We have the medical 
student, Mr. Stahe1i. 
MR. STAHELI: I think they have their place and it 
depends on what the problem is. 
THE COURT: Mr. Staheli, would the fact that 
you're a medical student, could you 
sit here and be fair and impartial 
and listen to the evidence and make 
your decision accordingly? 
MR. STAHELI: I think so. 
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THE COURT: You have to answer yes or no. 
MR. STAHELI: I will be fair and impartial here. 
* * * 
MR. NORTSTROM: In answer to your question, would I 
go to a chiropractor, no, I 
wouldn't, but that wouldn't affect 
me. 
(Tr. pp. 41, Ins. 24-25; 42, Ins. 1-3, 16-23; 43, Ins. 23-25). 
At the trial, there was no dispute over whether Chanhmany 
was negligent. The Court entered a directed verdict that she was 
not negligent and so instructed the jury. (Tr. p. 331, Jury 
Instruction 22, R. 293-338). 
In addition, although there was a dispute over whether 
Chanhmany should be compensated for every cent of her medical 
expenses (Tr. pp. 382, 383), there was no dispute that Chanhmany 
sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses. The defendants 
stipulated to the admission of Trial Exhibit P.-3, Chanhmany's 
medical bills. (Tr. pp. 278, 279). The exhibit shows that 
Chanhmany sustained the following medical expenses: 
Gold Cross Ambulance $ 158.09 
Holy Cross Hospital 
Emergency Room Care 256.00 
FHP 469.00 
Dr. Gary Whitley (Chiropractor) 2.416.00 
TOTAL $3,299.09 
No witness testified that the expenses were unnecessary 
or did not meet the study authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
307(2). Similarly, no party disputed the medical expenses by 
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requesting a medical panel as set forth in Utah Code Ann, § 31A-22-
307(2)(e). 
Because the parties did not dispute that Chanhmany 
sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses, the jury was not 
asked to find whether Chanhmany met the threshold requirements of 
Utah Code Ann, § 31A-22-309(1)(e)• Nor were they instructed that 
Chanhmany could not maintain a cause of action unless she sustained 
more than $3,000 in medical expenses. The jury was asked only to 
determine how much Chanhmany should receive for her medical 
expenses and general damages as reasonable compensation. (R. 293-
338, Instruction Nos. 21, 29; Special Verdict R. 342-343). 
There also was no dispute that Chanhmany was permanently 
disabled — only how much. Chanhmanyfs treating chiropractor, Gary 
Whitley, gave her a "whole person" impairment rating of twelve 
(12%) percent. (Tr. pp. 147-150). The defendant's medical expert, 
Dr. Gerald R. Morress gave her a rating of 6.8% (Tr. p. 220, 229, 
230) . A permanent impairment means that the accident victim is 
disabled. Dr. Whitley explained: 
Impairment is a physical loss of function.... 
* * * 
A disability is a rating that they're given 
according to whether they can continue 
functioning in their normal environment, their 
job, their home, their regular activities.... 
* * * 
You need to have an impairment in order to 
determine what a disability might be. 
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* * * 
That means [Chanhmany•s] 12% impaired for the 
whole function of the whole body for that 
particular injury a permanent kind of 
impairment. 
(Tr. pp. Ill, Ins. 12, 15-20, 23-24, 150, Ins. 7-9). 
Based on the unanimous medical opinions, received by the 
Court, the trial judge concluded that Chanhmany was disabled and 
entitled to some compensation: 
THE COURT: It has been established by both doctors 
that there's an injury, and what more do 
you have to tell that jury if she 
sustained an injury that may be compens-
able? They both assigned a rate of 
disability. One is 5 percent and the 
other is 12 percent. That jury is going 
to make its determination between five 
percent and twelve percent, how much 
should she receive. 
(Tr. p. 269, Ins. 2-10). 
* * * 
Either they believe Dr. Whitley that she 
has a 12 percent or they believe Dr. 
Morress that she has 5 percent. 
(Tr. p. 270, Ins. 16-19). 
Because the trial judge concluded that Chanhmany was not 
permanently disabled, the jury was not asked to find whether 
Chanhmany was permanently disabled and was not instructed that 
Chanhmany could not maintain a cause of action if she was not 
permanently disabled. (R. 293-338, Jury Instructions). Disability 
simply was not an issue. 
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The jury attributed 100 percent of the accident fault to 
Bone, but only awarded Chanhmany $2,100 in special damages as 
compensation for her medical expenses and $3,000 in general 
damages. (R. 342-343). Chanhmany objected to the proposed verdict 
on the grounds that Chanhmany was permanently disabled so she met 
the statutory threshold requirements. (R. 371-72; 375-78). 
Chanhmany also moved for a new trial or in the 
alternative, for an additur on the grounds that the jury 
disregarded the uncontroverted evidence and the verdict resulted 
from passion or prejudice. (R. 396-405). 
The lower court denied Chanhmany's motions and granted 
Bone's motion to strike the general damage award. (R. 426-427). 
Chanhmany timely appealed. (R. 428-429). 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
CHANHMANY IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE 
INADEQUATE AWARD FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES IS MORE THAN 
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. IT IS 
AGAINST ALL OF THE UNCONTROVERTED TRIAL EVIDENCE. 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S DECI8ION DENYING THE 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS UNREASONABLE 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (1) (e) provides that an 
injured auto accident victim may maintain a cause of action if the 
person sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses. The parties 
stipulated to the admission of Exhibit P-3, Chanhmany1s medical 
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expenses. No witness challenged the expenses or the medical 
treatment provided to Chanhmany. No disciplined review of the 
evidence justifies an award of less than $3,999. Thus, a new trial 
should be ordered or an additur imposed. John Call Engineering, 
Inc. v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1990). 
POINT II 
THE JURY'8 INADEQUATE DAMAGE AWARD AS COMPENSATION 
FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES DOES NOT WARRANT 
THE STRIKING OF THE GENERAL DAMAGES AWARD 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (e) does not explicitly 
require a jury to award reasonable compensation in excess of $3,000 
for medical expenses. It only requires the car accident victim 
sustain more than $3,000 in medical expenses. Thus, the jury was 
not asked to rule whether Chanhmany met the statutory threshold. 
There was no need to because there was no dispute. The parties did 
not avail themselves of the procedures provided in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-307. In summary, while people may differ as to how much 
Chanhmany should be compensated for medical expenses, there is no 
dispute that Chanhmany received the medical treatment and incurred 
the expenses. Thus, the lower court erred in striking the general 
damages' award. 
POINT III 
CHANHMANY 18 ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THERE IS NO 
FACTUAL DISPUTE THAT CHANHMANY WAS PERMANENTLY DISABLED 
All the medical testimony showed that Chanhmany has been 
permanently impaired 6.8 percent to 12 percent. If a person is 
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permanently impaired, he or she is permanently disabled. (Tr. p. 
Ill) ; see H.B. 15 (passed 2/4/94). The lower court judge concluded 
that 
Chanhmany was disabled. (Tr. p. 269, Ins. 2-10). Since there is 
no dispute that Chanhmany is disabled, the general damage award 
should not have been stricken. 
POINT IV 
THE JURY'S INADEQUATE AWARD FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES 
RESULTS FROM PREJUDICE 
The in court remarks of two jurors and the inadequate 
compensatory award for Chanhmany1s medical expenses show that the 
jury's verdict is a product of prejudice. Thus, the lower court's 
denial of Chanhmany's motion for a new trial was without a 
reasonable basis. This Court should remand the case for a new 
trial. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT CHANHMANY WAS 
DISABLED COUPLED WITH THE FAILURE TO SUBMIT THE 
DISABILITY ISSUE TO THE JURY AND SUBSEQUENT DENIAL 
OF CHANHMANY'8 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL EFFECTIVELY 
DENIED CHANHMANY HER RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON 
THIS IMPORTANT FACTUAL ISSUE 
In this case, all of the medical testimony shows that 
there was not a dispute over whether Chanhmany was permanently 
disabled. Rather, there was only a dispute as to the extent of the 
permanent disability. Thus, the lower court concluded that 
Chanhmany was permanently disabled and entitled to compensation. 
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(Tr. p. 269, Ins. 2-10). However, when the jury awarded less than 
$3,000 for compensation for medical expenses, the Court struck the 
general damages award. To do that, it had to conclude that 
Chanhmany was not permanently disabled. However, whether Chanhmany 
was permanently disabled, was a question of fact. Chanhmany's right 
to a jury trial on this important issue was denied. 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CHANHMANY IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE 
INADEQUATE AWARD FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES IS MORE THAN 
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. IT IS 
AGAINST ALL OF THE UNCONTROVERTED TRIAL EVIDENCE. 
THEREFORE. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DENYING THE 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS UNREASONABLE 
A. Factual Background — Marshalling of the Evidence. 
All the uncontroverted trial evidence established that 
Chanhmany incurred more than $3,000 in medical expenses as a result 
of the accident. At trial, the parties stipulated to admission of 
Exhibit P-3. (Tr. pp. 277, 289). The exhibit is a copy of the 
medical bills. They show that Chanhmany incurred the following 
medical expenses: 
Gold Cross Ambulance $ 158.09 
Holy Cross Hospital 
Emergency Room Care 256.00 
FHP 469.00 
Dr. Gary Whitley (Chiropractor) 2.416.00 
TOTAL $3,299.09 
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There are not any contrary exhibits. Moreover, not one witness 
testified that the foregoing expenses were not medical expenses or 
said that the expenses were not incurred as a result of the 
accident. 
At the trial, only three witnesses testified on the 
subject of medical expenses: Chanhmany, Dr. Gary Whitley, and Dr. 
Gerald R. Morress. A summary of each witnesses testimony follows: 
CHANHMANY: Chanhmany, the accident victim, testified that an 
ambulance took her to Holy Cross Hospital. At the 
hospital Chanhmany received medical treatment 
including x-rays and a neck collar. She also 
received treatment from Dr. Whitley. The treatment 
consisted of soft tissue massage, spinal adjust-
ments, and ultrasound treatments. In addition, she 
wore a neck brace and back brace provided by Dr. 
Whitley. She testified that Dr. Whitley's treat-
ment helped. (Tr. pp. 69-70, 71-72). In addition, 
she testified that she received treatment by Dr. 
Penny at FHP, and obtained physical therapy. (Tr. 
pp. 74, 75, 99, 100). 
DR. WHITLEY: Whitley testified that Chanhmany received the 
normal treatment for accident injury victims. (Tr. 
p. 131, Ins. 16-25; 132, Ins. 1-21). 
DR. MORRESS: Dr. Morress, a neurologist retained by the defen-
dant, did not criticize the medical expenses or the 
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medical treatment provided by Chanhmany's health 
care providers. His testimony was limited to 
describing the treatment provided by Dr. Penny and 
a comment that Dr. Whitley treated Chanhmany for 
the period indicated in her medical records for 
what Whitley, felt was the appropriate treatment. 
(Tr. pp. 199-200; 202, Ins. 3-11). 
B. Legal Analysis. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(1) provides that an injured 
car accident victim may maintain a cause of action if "the person 
has sustained . . . (e) medical expenses to a person in excess of 
$3,000.00." In this case, the medical expenses totalled $3,299.00. 
As shown in part "A" above, reasonable minds can only 
come to one conclusion, Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 in 
medical expenses. There is no dispute that as a result of the 
accident, Chanhmany received medical treatment and incurred the 
medical expenses. 
When a jury, as in this case, fails to take into account, 
proven facts and awards inadequate damages, the remedies are to 
either award a new trial or grant an additur. As explained in Paul 
v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 3, 261 P.2d 670 (1953): 
If inadequacy . . . of the verdict presents a 
situation that such inadequacy . . . shows a 
disregard by the jury of the evidence . . . 
then the court may . . . grant a new trial. 
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See also Wellman v, Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1969). Or 
the court may grant an additur to the verdict. See Bodon v. 
Suhrmann. 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826, 828 (1958). 
Similarly on appeal, the lower court's failure to grant 
a new trial or an additur is remedied by either ordering a new 
trial or by remanding with instructions to enter a judgment in the 
amount justified by the evidence. In John Call Engineering. Inc. 
v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1990), an engineering firm 
appealed a $13,440 jury verdict and claimed that the verdict was 
too low. As in this case, the plaintiff moved for a new trial 
and/or requested additional damages both of which were rejected. 
The Court of Appeals examined the evidence of damages and 
concluded: 
While plausible views of the evidence might 
have led to fixing a damage award at certain 
other levels within this broad range, no 
evidence of record, nor any disciplined view 
of the evidence of record would support an 
award outside this range. . . . On appeal, 
although it [Call] would settle for a new 
trial, Call principally argues the court 
erred, given the lack of any contrary evidence 
in not directing a verdict or judgment in this 
minimal amount and that we should remand with 
instructions to do so. 
* * * 
In this case, while reasonable minds could 
differ on whether Call was entitled to more, 
the evidence established it was clearly 
entitled to judgment in at least the amount of 
$56,377.60. . . . Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment which was entered on the jury's 
verdict and remand with instructions to enter 
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judgment in the principal amount of 
$56,377.60. 
John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 683 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
As in Call, there is no record evidence showing that 
Chanhmany's medical expenses were less than $3,299. Moreover, any 
disciplined view of the evidence supports an award of medical 
expenses for $3,299. Thus, this Court should either grant 
Chanhmany a new trial or remand with instructions to enter a 
judgment in the amount of $3,299 for medical expenses, and to 
reinstate the general damage award. 
POINT II 
THE JURY'S INADEQUATE DAMAGE AWARD AS COMPENSATION 
FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES DOES NOT WARRANT 
THE STRIKING OF THE GENERAL DAMAGES AWARD 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(1)(e) only requires that a 
car accident victim sustain medical damages in excess of $3,000 in 
order to maintain a cause of action. It does not require a jury to 
award compensatory damages for medical expenses in excess of 
$3,000. Nor does it explicitly state how to resolve disputes over 
whether a victim has sustained more than $3,000 in medical 
expenses. However, section 3 07 has some suggestions. This section 
of the Utah no-fault law, is designed so that the statute will 
apply with an even-handed manner. See R. E. Keaton, Compensatory 
Systems and Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 Utah L.Rev. 383, 391. 
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Specifically, Utah Code Ann, § 31-22-307 provides that in 
a disputed case, the parties can refer to the study authorized by 
subsection (2) . Or, the Court on its own motion, or on the motion 
of either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not 
more than three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and 
testify before the Court. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(2)(d). 
The fact that neither of the parties nor the Court used 
the study nor the panel shows that there was never a dispute that 
Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses. More-
over, even if there was a dispute, the jury was not asked to 
resolve it. It was not asked to determine whether Chanhmany met 
the threshold requirements of Section 309. All it was asked to do, 
was to determine reasonable compensatory damages for medical 
expenses (R. 342-343). As such, the award in and of itself, does 
not show that Chanhmany did not sustain more than $3,000 in medical 
expenses. Thus, the Court's reliance on the special verdict, to 
find that Chanhmany did not meet the threshold requirements (R. 
392-395) was misplaced. 
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POINT III 
CHANHMANY IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THERE IS NO 
FACTUAL DISPUTE THAT CHANHMANY WAS PERMANENTLY DISABLED 
A. Factual Background — Marshalling of the Evidence. 
Chanhmany is permanently disabled. She said so in her 
testimony. All the medical experts agreed that she was disabled 
and so did the trial judge. 
Chanhmany testified that she still has sharp pains in her 
lower back and numbness in her shoulder. The pain and numbness are 
substantiated by her medical records. (Tr. pp. 73-74; Trial Ex. 
P-19, P-20). She cannot lift the 50 lb. boxes without help from 
her co-workers. (Tr. pp. 76, 77, 90-91, 260). She has trouble 
lifting the laundry or the groceries. (Tr. p. 77). She cannot do 
sit ups. (Tr. p. 78). She no longer participates in sports. (Tr. 
p. 79). 
Dr. Gerald R. Morress, the defendant's medical expert, 
performed an Independent Medical Examination (IME). Based on his 
IME and Chanhmany's medical records, he gave Chanhmany a 6.8% whole 
person permanent impairment rating. He determined that Chanhmany's 
back pain and numbness in her shoulder equal a 6.8% permanent 
impairment rating under the guidelines promulgated by the American 
Medical Association (AMA). (Tr. p. 220, 230). 
Dr. Whitley, the treating chiropractor, treated 
Chanhmany, and applied the same AMA guidelines to conclude that 
Chanhmany had a 12% permanent impairment rating or disability. (Tr. 
20 
pp. 147-150) . He concluded that in addition to the lower back pain 
and numbness in her shoulder, Chanhmany1s neck, shoulder and back 
range of motions were all impaired. (Tr. pp. 149-150). If a person 
has a permanent impairment rating, he is by definition disabled. 
Dr. Whitley so testified: 
Impairment is a physical loss of function.... 
A disability is rating that they're given 
according to whether they continue functioning 
in their normal environment, their job, their 
home, their regular activities. 
* * * 
You need to have an impairment in order to 
determine what a disability might be. 
(Tr. p. Ill, Ins. 12-18, 23-24). 
From the foregoing evidence and testimony, the trial 
court judge concluded that Chanhmany was permanently disabled and 
entitled to some compensation: 
THE COURT: It has been established by both doctors 
that there is an injury and what more do 
you have to tell that jury if she sus-
tained an injury that may be compensable? 
They both assigned a rate of disability. 
One is 5 percent and the other is 12 
percent. That jury is going to make its 
determination between five percent and 
twelve percent. How much she should 
receive. 
(Tr. p. 269, Ins. 2-10). 
Thus, the lower court did not instruct the jury on 
Section 31-22-309(1)(c). Nor did it submit the disability issue to 
the jury. There was no need. All the witnesses testified on the 
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subject agreed that she was disabled and the trial court judge 
concluded that she was disabled. . • until the jury returned an 
award of $2,100 for medical expenses. The defendants moved to 
strike the general damages awarded. Chanhmany pointed out that the 
damage award should stand because there was no factual dispute that 
Chanhmany was permanently disabled and sustained more than $3,000 
in medical expenses. (R. 371-372, 375-378, 398-405). The trial 
court, however, struck the general damages award and by necessity 
concluded that contrary to all of the evidence marshalled above, 
Chanhmany was not permanently disabled. 
B. Legal Analysis. 
Utah's no-fault statute does not define the term 
disability. However, in Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 
592 P.2d 609, 611 (Utah 1979), the court defined disability as 
meaning the inability to work.1 The evidence in this case clearly 
met the foregoing definition. Chanhmany testified that she could 
not lift the 50 lb. boxes without help by her co-workers. Her 
testimony was supported by her co-worker. (Tr. p. 2 60). Hence, her 
employee transferred her to packaging. (See Tr. pp. 90-91).2 
!0ther state courts have concluded that injuries comparable to 
Chanhmany's can be a permanent disability. E.g. Elliott v. Simon, 
385 A.2d 249 (N.J. 1978); see, Johnson v. Phillips, 345 So.2d 1116 
(Fla. App. 1477) ("permanent injury"). 
2In other words, the employer made a reasonable accommodation 
consistent with the Americans With Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. 
1211(9)(A) and (B). 
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If there ever was ^r\'r .-2—jbt whether Chanhmany's injuries 
met the definition of disabil * * * <r .emoved when 
legisl .?. .- last ses 
"permanent disability" to "permanent disabilit. permanent 
impairment based upon objective findings" H.B. 3 - , (passed 
2 /" 4 /" 9 4 ) . T h e J. e g I s I, a t i v v i h
 : ; 
consistent with the testimony provided by »n t - . That is, a 
permanent impairment means that the individual has incurred a 
permanent di sab i1ity. 
In summary, i 10 matter which definition of disability i s 
used, : t::i le e\ i dei ice oi i the issue shows that Chanhmany i s 
disabled. Sh disabled the performance of her work, and 
is disabled '* i V: permanent j;o : n. numbness, and a restricted range 
c , t court's refusal to grant 
a new trial ri without
 : easonable basis. 
POINT IV 
THE JURY'S INADEQUATE AWARD FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES 
RESULTS FROM PREJUDICE 
A. Factual Background — Proceeding Before the Lover Court. 
rwri * jurors showed that they were 
pr e j iicli ced * I" he i r hands 
when the ti . . ; - ,- i . > .3 opposed treatment 
by chiropra * - * 1 - 2 ) . Juror 
Stahe 1 i , A U" eicl or." h.i ve 
their place, it depends on what the problem is. He also hesitated 
in answering whether he could base his decision on the evidence. 
(Tr. p. 42, Ins. 16-23). Similarly, Juror Nortstrom said that he 
would not go to a chiropractor. (Tr. p. 43, Ins. 23-24). 
While both of them pledged that they would base their 
verdict on the evidence, an inadequate compensatory award for 
medical damages shows that they and the other jurors did not. 
Instead, as set forth in Point I, the jury disregarded the 
uncontested evidence that Chanhmany sustained $3,299.09 and awarded 
her only $2,001.00 in medical expenses. 
B. Legal Analysis. 
An inadequate verdict, may make it appear that the 
verdict was given under the influence of prejudice. See Meyer v. 
Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558, 560 (Utah 1984). In addition, the 
failure to take into account proven facts is prejudice. See Wellman 
v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 353; 366 P.2d 701 (1969). Prejudice may 
also be shown when the jury disregards competent evidence. See 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co., 701 P. 2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 
1985). Finally, juror prejudice may be shown by answering 
questions on voir dire. E.g. Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533 
(Utah 1981)3 
3In Jenkins, a statement by a prospective juror on voir dire 
that he would give more weight to the testimony of the witnesses' 
status as a doctor, established prejudice or bias and required a 
new trial. 
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In this case, prejudice i s conclusively shown by a I I, ul 
t^e above jurors expressed distrust of chiropractors and 
^pensatoi lamages for all * ~: medical 
expenses Chanhmany incurred ui:. Whitley, T - * 
compensatory award t * medical expense isregarded the medical 
u i I I I'.i present (M J In ^^.u^ i-ur medical 
expenses, the jury had to disregard the uncontested evidence. 
Thus, there is nn reasonable basis tor the trial court's refusal to 
grant a ri"1.'1 \\ i tl. The decisioi 1 shou M I"1 ""versoi1 ai'"l "hi" case 
remanded t o r trial. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT CHANHMANY WAS 
DISABLED COUPLED WITH THE FAILURE TO SUBMIT THE 
DISABILITY ISSUE TO THE JURY AND SUBSEQUENT DENIAL 
OF CHANHMANY'8 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL EFFECTIVELY 
DENIED CHANHMANY HER RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON 
THIS IMPORTANT FACTUAL ISSUE 
Utah's Const, ar t I, § 1 0 guarantees the right to a jury 
tri a 1 :! i : • :i :i II cases International Harvester Credit Corp. v. 
Pioneer Tractor and Implement. Inc. , h;f» 1 ,.'<1 i 11* (i MI ) . 
Thi.c important right, indamental p a n 
j tu ^ u . xne >~ extends 
t~ .. *v * rav not bp -i * j 
Estrada, - Utah rt \ section 1 0 
c Ant uuts j.jLynu i factual issue 
tried a proper demand. Holland v. Wilson. 
2d 11 # 8). 
In this case, Chanhmany demanded a jury trial. (R. 2-8) . 
The issue of whether an individual is permanently disabled is a 
factual issue. Elliott, supra: see Johnson. supra; Lynch v. 
Adirondack Transport Lines Inc., 564 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1991); Petrone 
v. Thornton, 561 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1990). However, because there was no 
dispute that Chanhmany was disabled, see Point III above, the trial 
judge concluded that Chanhmany was disabled and the issue was not 
presented to the jury. Only, after the jury awarded less than 
$3,000 as compensation for medical expenses, the lower court struck 
the general damages award. To strike the general damages award, 
the Court had to change its mind and conclude that Chanhmany was 
not permanently disabled. The trouble with all of that is, that 
Chanhmany had a constitutional right to have a this factual issue 
determined by a jury. The remedy for the Court's failure to do so, 
is to grant a new trial. Holland v. Wilson, supra. 
x. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's decision denying Chanhmany a new trial 
lacks a reasonable basis. There is no dispute. She is permanently 
disabled. There is no dispute she sustained more than $3,000 in 
medical expenses. Two jurors expressed prejudice. In addition, at 
the very least, Chanhmany was deprived of her constitutional right 
to a jury trial on the disability issue. For each of these 
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reasons, the Orrtnr ind Judgment nf tho 1 ovo-*- court should be 
reversed and tho ra-.! remanded for a now trial. 
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ADDENDUM 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND 
ORDINANCES 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT 
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT JnYi.'K l'l.'UST< ill "! J l lb<..MI''NT nu 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
ADDENDUM 1 
Sec, ] 0. [ rrii il 1 >y jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. 
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
History: Const. 18%. 
Cross-References. — Civil actions, right to 
jury trial in, U.R.C.P., Rules 38, 39. 
31A-22-307. Personal injury protection cover-
ages and benefits. 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and bene-
fits include: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for 
necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, reha-
bilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambu-
lance, hospital, and nursing services, not to ex-
ceed a total of $3,000 per person; 
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of 
any loss of gross income and loss of earning 
capacity per person from inability to work, 
for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after 
the loss, except that this benefit need not be 
paid for the first three days of disability, un-
less the disability continues for longer than 
two consecutive weeks after the date of in-
jury; and 
(ii) a special damage allowance not ex-
ceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 
days, for services actually rendered or ex-
penses reasonably incurred for services that, 
but for the injury, the injured person would 
have performed for his household, except 
that this benefit need not be paid for the first 
three days after the date of injury unless the 
person's inability to perform these services 
continues for more than two consecutive 
weeks; 
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to 
exceed a total of $1,500 per person; and 
(d) compensation on account of death of a per-
son, payable to his heirs, in the total of $3,000. 
(2) (a) To determine the reasonable value of the 
medical expenses provided for in Subsection (1) 
and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the com-
missioner shall conduct a relative value study of 
services and accommodations for the diagnosis, 
care, recovery, or rehabilitation of an injured per-
son in the most populous county in the state to 
assign a unit value and determine the 75th per-
centile charge for each type of service and accom-
modation. The study shall be updated every other 
year. In conducting the study, the department 
may consult or contract with appropriate public 
and private medical and health agencies or other 
technical experts. The costs and expenses in-
curred in conducting, maintaining, and adminis-
tering the relative value study shall be funded by 
the tax created under Section 59-9-105. Upon 
completion of the study, the department shall 
prepare and publish a relative value study which 
sets forth the unit value and the 75th percentile 
charge assigned to each type of service and ac-
commodation. 
(b) The reasonable value of any service or ac-
commodation is determined by applying the unit 
value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to 
the service or accommodation under the relative 
value study. If a service or accommodation is not 
assigned a unit value or the 75th percentile 
charge under the relative value study, the value 
of the service or accommodation shall equal the 
reasonable cost of the same or similar service or 
accommodation in the most populous county of 
this state. 
(c) This subsection does not preclude the de-
partment from adopting a schedule already es-
tablished or a schedule prepared by persons out-
side the department, if it meets the requirements 
of this subsection. 
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commis-
sioner of Insurance any patterns of overcharging, 
excessive treatment, or other improper actions by 
a health provider within 30 days after such in-
surer has knowledge of such pattern. 
(e) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion 
or on the motion of either party may designate an 
impartial medical panel of not more than three 
licensed physicians to examine the claimant and 
testify on the issue of the reasonable value of the 
claimant's medical services or expenses. 
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection 
(l)(a) and in Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e) include ex-
penses for any nonmedical remedial care and treat-
ment rendered in accordance with a recognized reli-
gious method of healing. 
(4) This section does not prohibit the issuance of 
policies of insurance providing coverages greater 
than the minimum coverage required under this 
chapter nor does it require the segregation of those 
minimum coverages from other coverages in the same 
policy. 
(5) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to 
the insurance coverages required under this section. 
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31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and condi-
tions to personal injury protection. 
( D A person who has or is required to have direct 
benefit coverage under a policy which includes per-
sonal injury protection may not maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out of personal 
injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile 
accident, except where the person has sustained one 
or more of the following 
fa) death, 
(b) dismemberment, 
(c) permanent disability, 
(d) permanent disfigurement, or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of 
$3,000 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protec-
tion coverage under this part may only exclude 
from this coverage benefits 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured 
while occupying another motor vehicle 
owned by or furnished for the regular use of 
the insured or a resident family member of 
the insured and not insured under the policy, 
(n) for any injury sustained by any person 
while operating the insured motor vehicle 
without the express or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful possession of 
the insured motor vehicle, 
(in) to any injured person, if the person's 
conduct contributed to his injury 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to 
himself, or 
(B) while committing a felony, 
dv) for any injury sustained by any person 
arising out of the use of any motor vehicle 
while located for use as a residence or prem-
ises; 
(v) for any injury due to war whether or 
not declared, civil war, insurrection, rebel-
lion or revolution, or to any act or condition 
incident to any of the foregoing, or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the ra-
dioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazard-
ous properties of nuclear materials 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not 
limit the exclusions which may be contained in 
other types of coverage 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person un-
der Section 31A-22-307 are reduced by 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or 
is entitled to receive as a result of an accident 
covered in this code under any workers' compen-
sation or similar statutory plan, and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or 
is entitled to receive from the United States or 
any of its agencies because he is on active duty in 
the military service 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party 
under any other policy, including those policies com-
plying with this part, primary coverage is given by 
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during 
the accident 
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 
31A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly basis as ex-
penses are incurred Benefits for anv period are over-
due if the \ are not paid within 30 days after the in-
surer receives reasonable proof of the fact and 
amount of expenses incurred during the period If 
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, 
the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue 
if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received 
by the insurer Anv part or all of the remainder of the 
claim tha t is later supported by reasonable proof is 
also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof 
is received by the insurer If the insurer fails to pav 
the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear in-
terest at the rate of V/2% per month after the due 
date The person entitled to the benefits mav bring an 
action in contract to recover the expenses plus the 
applicable interest If the insurer is required by the 
action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the 
insurer is also required to pav a reasonable attorney's 
fee to the claimant 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protec-
tion coverage is subject to the following 
(a 1 tha t where the insured under the policy is 
or would be held legally liable for the personal 
injuries sustained by any person to whom bene-
fits required under personal injury protection 
have been paid by another insurer, including the 
Workers ' Compensation Fund of Utah, the in-
surer of the person who would be held legally 
liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the 
payment, but not in excess of the amount of dam-
ages recoverable, and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reim-
bursement and its amount shall be decided by 
mandatory binding arbitration between the in-
surers 1992 
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regarding a victim's response to patterns of 
domestic abuse or violence be considered by the trier 
of fact in determining imminence or reasonableness 
in accordance with that section, and that the 
evidence be considered when useful in understanding 
the perceptions or conduct of a witness. 
An Act relating to the insurance code; 
permitting a cause of action for general 
damages from personal injuries caused by 
an automobile accident in cases of 
permanent impairment; and making 
technical corrections. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
31A-22-309, as last amended by Chapter 230, 
Laws of Utah 1992 
Be It taMCted by the LegislMttve of the state of Uub: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 31A-22-309, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as last amended by Chapter 230, Laws of 
Utah 1992, is amended to read: 
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and 
conditions to personal injury protection. 
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct 
benefit coverage under a policy which includes 
personal injury protection may not maintain a cause 
of action for general damages arising out of 
personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an 
automobile accident, except where the person has 
sustained one or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment 
based upon objective findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of 
$3,000. 
(2)(a) Any insurer issuing personal injury 
protection coverage under this part may only 
exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while 
occupying another motor vehicle owned by or 
furnished for the regular use of the insured or a 
resident family member of the insured and not 
insured under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while 
operating the insured motor vehicle without the 
express or implied consent of the insured or while 
not in lawful possession of the insured motor 
vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct 
contributed to his injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising 
out of the use of any motor vehicle while located 
for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not 
declared, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or 
revolution, or to any act or condition incident to 
any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, 
toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of 
nuclear materials. 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit 
the exclusions which may be contained in other 
types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person 
under Section 31A-22-307 are reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is 
entitled to receive as a result of an accident covered 
in this code under any workers' compensation or 
similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is 
entitled to receive from the United States or any of 
its agencies because [he] that person is on active 
duty in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party 
under any other policy, including those policies 
complying with this part, primary coverage is given 
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use 
during the accident. 
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in 
Section 31 A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly 
basis as expenses are incurred. 
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are 
not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives 
reasonable proof of the fact and amount of 
expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable 
proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the 
amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if 
not paid within 30 days after that proof is received 
by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of 
I the claim that is later supported by reasonable proof 
is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the 
proof is received by the insurer. 
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when 
due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of 
l-l/27t per month after the due date. 
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring 
an action in contract to recover the expenses plus 
the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by 
the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, 
the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable 
attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury 
protection coverage is subject to the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or 
would be held legally liable for the personal injuries 
sustained by any person to whom benefits required 
under personal injury protection have been paid by 
another insurer, including the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the 
person who would be held legally liable shall 
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not 
in excess of the amount of damages recoverable; 
and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that 
reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by 
H. B. No. 15 
Passed 2/4/94, Approved 2/16/94 
Effective 5/2/94 
Laws of Utah 1994, Chapter 4 
Motor Vehicle Insurance - Personal 
Injury Protection 
By John L. Valentine, Kelly C. Atkinson, Steve 
Barth, J. Brent Haymond, Russell A. Cannon, 
Frank R. Pignanelli, J. Reese Hunter, Met 
Johnson 
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: J 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion Rule 606. 
for new trial, $ 21-2-2. 
Harmless error not ground for new trial. 
Rule 61. 
ADDENDUM 2 
^ERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Bone 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180) 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY CHANHMANY, a minor, by and ) 
through his natural mother and 
guardian, KHAI CHANHMANY, and 
KHAI CHANHMANY, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOYCE A. PRESTON and BRIAN D. 
BONE, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR ADDITUR 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
FOR A NEW TRIAL 
| Civil No. 910907726PI | Judge John A. Rokich 
The motion of the plaintiffs for additur or in the 
alternative for a new trial having come before this Court on 
October 4, 1993, Edward T. Wells appearing for the plaintiffs and 
Wendell E. Bennett and Terry M. Plant appearing for defendants 
Preston and Bone, respectively, the Court having considered the 
memorandum of the plaintiff and defendant Bone and being otherwise 
fully advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
motion of the plaintiffs for additur or in the alternative for a 
new trial is hereby denied, and the Judgment on Special Verdict 
entered by this Court on July 29, 1993 will stand. 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 0 1 1993 
ft Cd*J...tY 
OS?-
L/'rijJuty CrtiH 
DATED this /^-dav of Qefeetees, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
^HONORABLE JOHN fSf. ROKICH 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL, postage prepaid, this "J^^day of 
October, 1993, to the following: 
Edward T. Wells 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Wendell E. Bennett 
Attorney for Defendant Preston 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
O W ^ : 
TMP:lr}/92-152.53 -2-
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TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Bone 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180) 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-. i 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
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Third Judicial District 
JUL 2 9 1993 
S^J/UKJ^OUNTY 
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Deputy Clew 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY CHANHMANY, a minor, by and 
through his natural mother and 
guardian, KHAI CHANHMANY, and 
KHAI CHANHMANY, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOYCE A. PRESTON and BRIAN D. 
BONE, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL 
VERDICT 
Civil No. 910907726PI 
Judge John A. Rokich 
The above-entitled case was tried before a jury 
commencing April 993 and continuing through April 29, 1993 on 
tlit* i uHifij] a iLii'i ii juiti.tit, Khai Chanhmany, versus both Joyce 
A, Preston and Bria: . Bone, The clai in of plaintiff Randy 
Chanhmany was bifurcated from the case of Khai Chanhmany just prior 
t -.-:• - • -.e "jury, having heard evidence 
produced by the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany, the Court having received 
the Special Verdict on the jury and also having considered the 
issue whether or not 1 laintiff had met the t .hreshold 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309•( 1) and having made 
its Minute Entry on July 1, 1993, based upon the Special Verdict of 
t h e j u r y »ii il I.he Hi 11 rite lintiy , 
1
 IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. plaintiff Khai Chanhmany was not negligent. 
2. : Etndant Joyce A. Preston was not negligent. 
1
 /.o defendant Brian D. Bone •> • negligent
 f and hi s 
negligence was th« *** le proximate cause of x. Mmaqes ,: 1 a lined bv 
the plaintiit hi. nanhmany. 
I The total damages which have been incurred by Kha i 
CI I a i" 111 ni a n y «i * i i l r' ii \ ;,l I *: o n s e qii e n c e o f t: h = • n e g 1 i g e nc e o f B i: i a i:i 1) 
Bone are as follows: 
a. ast medical expenses $2,100.00 
b. --s 101.00 
TOTAL $2f201.00 
5. Even though the jury in i ts Special verdict found 
general damages in favor of the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany in the sum, 
of $3 , 000 3: , . • accordance with the Minute Entry :)f the Court 
d a t e d J u l y 1 , 1 9 9 3 , \ \\<* Cuiiit , p n ' i 1 }\:a I 1 > tindr. I h»-jt .. ii • * J I iml 
entitled to general damages in this matter because she failed 
meet the threshold requirements of § 31A-22-309(] ) Utah Codp 
Annotated ( Due I .c > th< : s f.. a,c I t ,1: lat 
f a i l e d +-' p r o v e that she had iiiel : the $3,000.00 1 Jireshol : •: 
medical expenses . required by Utah Code Annotated 31A-22-
3 - in: f :l:ie:i : til a I : J'laxnL if ^ LI ed I'u 
prove that she had sufferect permanent disability i n accordance 
_ 2-
w i t h U t a h C o d e A n n o t a t e d ', I1A-2J-JOy| I I M I . T h e Court tuither 
finds that the award made by the jury tor general damages was 
;
 T,Hi r-.4t;i ve - "i»t find P l a i n t i f f s u f f e r i n g f r o m 
• :- - p e r m a n e n : . urther, the Court specifically finds 
that Mie plaintiff failed ~ comply v.. any of the other potential 
"threshold" crltei ia iL,.eL jde Annotated -309 
(195 3, as amended). 
Plaintiff Khai Chanhmany :? therefore, entitled T o 
a judgment aga f 
$. -TO" "" ".• Lnterest ./. < amount : l 4 0 . ^ ^ n c :ostt .x.e 
amouiiL ui ^i? iui. d iotdi judgment ui $2,822.30. 
7, Defendant Joyce A, Preston is entitled to judgment 
against the plaintiff Khai Chanhman; - -..*- plaintiff's complaint 
o • . cosus 
from the plaint..: : .,;.. , Chanhmany. 
.etermined that all judgment entered herein 
will - rcordance 
with Utah statute, Utah Code Annotated _ . ^ amended). 
DATED this o? 9 day of Jul y, 1993. 
BY THE ( 
/dL— A - K ^iL^JL 
NORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
istrict Court Judge 
-3-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hi'n.'hy uiiii. N y th.it I mai J ^d a 1 i uu and 'nncti. o >py oT 
the foregoing JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT, postage prepaid, this 
i-o uae following: 
Edward T. Wells 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Wendell E. Bennett 
Attorney for Defendant Preston 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
TMP:lrj/92-152.43 -4-
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4 i i fH '33 
•-.'AI8T 
;f 
EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 °' — "C3 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY 
JOYCE 
CHANHMANY, et al., ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A. PRESTON, et al., ] 
Defendant. ] 
i MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR 
> THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A 
) NEW TRIAL 
I livii No. 910907726PI 
) Jb : c:h 
IN 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59, Utah Rules of 
Civi 1 Procedure, p] a i i 11:ii f f in« Dv es the Co\ ir t f :)r a1n nid 11 u r nr 111 tin• 
alternative for a new txi al on the issue of damages. 
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum filed 
herew i t,h. 
DATED this 3 o — day of . 1993. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
JUL 31 
7t. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that true and comjt ( '-npio1 of tin 
foregoing MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL 
(Chanhmany v. Preston) were mailed, postage prepaid, th i s 
sj j/( / , J 9(J I 1  i i f hie ! 111 J i iw i nq: 
Wendell E. Bennett 
448 East 400 South, #304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Terry M. Plant 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 5 00 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT
 8411G-z?/0 
4148-040\vah 
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY CHANHMANY, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOYCE A. PRESTON, et al., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR 
THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A 
I NEW TRIAL 
) Civil No. 910907726PI 
i Judge John A. Rokicn 
OF 
IN 
Plaintiff submits the following Memorandum in support of 
her moti < :>i i foi : a n a< Idi ti i:i : or i i 1 tl: ICE a 1 ternative for a new t::i : :i a l on 
the issue of damages. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
i \ t t r i a ] , 11: i e f o ] ] o w i i i g facts were est a b 1 i s h e ci b y 
undisputed testimony: 
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident on 
i a i i B o n e c o 1 ] I d e ci w :i t: - *.- r 
vehicle. 
. Gary Whitley testified as to treatment rendered 
for her $3,299. < 9. 
wuL 3i 4 ±- H '33 
:;OT 
3. "•-•. Whitley testified the treatment received by Khai 
Chanhmany was reasonable and necessary. 
4. No witness testified to there being a smaller amount 
as the reasonable and necessary amount of treatment, and there was 
no ties" • * : 
received by plaintiff were unnecessary, or that any specific amount 
charged was n~* reasonable. 
5. medical b 1.1.1 s, a n d i t wa s 
admitted showing total bills to be $3,299.09. 
6. No evidence was received to contradict this amount 
or to show a lesser amount as reasonable and necessary c: :i : to 
dispute the reasonableness necessity ct .*:,•- tern shown therein. 
7. Defenda 
plaintiff's bil lings were unreasonable -.. unnecessary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SPECIAL DAMAGE AWARD IS INSUFFICIENT UNDER THE EVIDENCE 
AND THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT AN APPROPRIATE ADDITUR OR, IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES 
Hnli" 11 i i, 11 |'. i in I 111 Utcili Ku J eto ul Civil Procedure 
provides, pertinent part, as follows: 
(a) [A] new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues, for any of the following causes, , 
(5) Excessive or inadequate 
damages, appeari ng to have been 
2 
given under the influence or passion 
or prejudice. 
While granting a new trial is one remedy for inadequate 
damages, the Utah Supreme Court has held that implicit within the 
authority of the Court to grant a new trial is the power to grant 
an additur to the verdict. In Boden v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 
P.2d 826, 828 (1958), the Court stated: 
There is implicit within the authority of the 
court to grant a new trial on the statutory 
ground of "excessive or inadequate damages" 
the power to order a new trial conditionally; 
that is, to order that a new trial be granted 
unless the part adversely affected by the 
order agrees to a remittitur or an additur of 
the damages to an amount within proper limits 
as viewed by the court. 
The Court explained that this process of modifying the 
verdict to bring it within the evidence is reserved for situations 
where the verdict is outside the limits of what appears justifiable 
under the evidence to such an extent that the verdict should not be 
permitted to stand. Id. at 829. 
In Paul v. Kirkendall. 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670, 671 
(1953), the Utah Supreme Court explained the standard in 
determining whether to grant an additur or new trial as follows: 
If inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict 
presents a situation that such inadequacy or 
excessiveness shows a disregard by the jury of 
the evidence or the instructions of the Court 
as to the law applicable to the case as to 
satisfy the court that the verdict was 
rendered under such disregard or misappre-
hension of the evidence or influence of 
passion or prejudice, then the court may 
exercise its discretion in the interest of 
justice and grant a new trial. 
The Court further clarified this standard in Wellman v. 
Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (Utah) by stating that an 
additur or new trial is warranted where "it seems clear that the 
jury has misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts; or 
misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made findings clearly 
against the weight of the evidence." Id. at 354. 
The plaintiff acknowledges that it is generally the 
prerogative of the jury to make the determination of damages. 
Jensen v. Ekins, 575 P.2d 179 (Utah 1978). Where, however, the 
standards listed above have been satisfied, the trial court can and 
should step in and exercise its prerogative to bring the verdict 
within the limits of the evidence. Such is the case here. 
This is not a case where the plaintiff is dissatisfied 
with the amount of a general verdict and requests an additur. This 
is a case where the jury rendered a special verdict. The damage 
award of that special verdict on the issue of special damages is 
inconsistent with the evidence on special damages which was before 
the jury, and upon which they must base their verdict. 
The jury found that defendant Bone was negligent and that 
this negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The 
4 
undisputed testimony was that the amount of reasonable and 
necessary medical care received by plaintiff was $3,299.09. 
In the case of John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City 
Corporation, 795 P.2d 678, 683 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that a jury award below the lowest figure for damages 
set forth in the evidence could not be allowed to stand and 
reversed the case and sent it back to the trial court with 
instructions to enter judgment for the lowest amount of damages 
established by testimony. In this case, that figure would be the 
$3,299.09 for special damages. 
When a verdict is supported by competent evidence, the 
court usually leaves it as it is. When, however, there is no 
evidence to support an award, the court may take action to conform 
the award to the evidence. See Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958). 
An additur is a proper method of treating a situation 
where inadequate damages are awarded. See Bodon v. Suhrmann, 
supra. 
In the present case, the only evidence on the issue was 
that $3,299.09 was the amount spent by plaintiff for medical 
expenses for treatment of injuries received in the accident. Dr. 
Whitley testified such amount was reasonable and necessary. No 
testimony was received to the contrary. Therefore, an additur to 
5 
bring the special damages to $3,299.09 should be granted. In the 
alternative, a new trial should be granted on this issue because 
the jury did not follow the evidence and instructions of the Court. 
Instruction Number 29 instructed the jury to award special damages 
for "reasonable and necessary expenses for doctors, x-rays, and 
other medical services actually incurred by plaintiff." 
$3,299.09 was the amount of expense actually incurred by 
plaintiff and according to testimony of Dr. Whitley, such was 
reasonable and necessary. There was no contrary evidence. 
Failure of the jury to follow the instructions of the 
court on the law is sufficient basis for granting a new trial. 
Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin. 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615 
(1966) ; Matter of Acquisition of Property by Eminent Domain, 236 
Kan. 417, 690 P.2d 1375 (1984); Cole v. Gerhart. 5 Ariz. App. 24, 
423 P.2d 100 (1967); Seooi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683 
(1978); Salvail v. Great Northern Rv Co.. 473 P.2d 549 (Mont. 
1970); Price v. Sinnot, 85 Nev. 600, 460 P.2d 837 (1969) affd. 90 
Nev. 5, 517 P.2d 1006 (1974). 
A new trial is also proper where there is insufficient 
evidence to support the jury verdict. Efco Distributing, Inc. v. 
Perrin, supra; Villeaas v. Brvson. 16 Ariz. App. 456, 494 P.2d 61 
(1972). 
6 
The whole purpose of a new trial is to correct errors 
made at the trial. In the present case, the jury made obvious 
errors in not following the court's instruction on damages and in 
failing to award special damages according to the undisputed 
evidence. 
As the court observed in Efco Distributing, Inc. v. 
Perrin, supra: 
If is clearly appears that there has been a 
miscarriage of justice because the jury has 
refused to accept credible, uncontradicted 
evidence where there is no rational basis for 
rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that 
the jury has acted under a misconception of 
proven facts, or has misapplied or disregarded 
the law, or where it appears that the verdict 
was the result of passion or prejudice, it is 
both the prerogative and the duty of the court 
to set aside the verdict and grant a new 
trial. 
In the present case, the findings of the jury do not 
follow the evidence. In the event the court does not grant the 
additur motion, a new trial should be granted on damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury's answers to the question on special damages is 
not justified under the evidence in the case and cannot be allowed 
to stand. 
The evidence at trial argues for an additur to $3,299.09 
to comply with the evidence at trial on special damages; or in the 
alternative for a new trial on the damage issue. 
3cP day of J W / DATED this JC/  of \J V I f 1993. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
By: -TLM 
DWARD T. WELLS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL (Chanhmany v. Preston) were mailed, 
postage prepaid, this ^)Q -*~ day of J~U I / / 1993 to 
the following: 
Wendell E. Bennett 
448 East 400 South, #304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Terry M. Plant 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
4148-039\vah 
TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Bone 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180] 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY CHANHMANY, a minor, by and 
through his natural mother and 
guardian, KHAI CHANHMANY, and 
KHAI CHANHMANY, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
JOYCE A. PRESTON and BRIAN D. 
BONE, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL 
VERDICT 
Civil No. 910907726PI 
Judge John A. Rokich 
The above-entitled case was tried before a jury 
commencing April 27, 1993 and continuing through April 29, 1993 on 
the complaint of the plaintiff, Khai Chanhmany, versus both Joyce 
A. Preston and Brian D. Bone. The claim of plaintiff Randy 
Chanhmany was bifurcated from the case of Khai Chanhmany just prior 
to the commencement of trial. The jury, having heard evidence 
produced by the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany, the Court having received 
the Special Verdict on the jury and also having considered the 
issue as to whether or not Plaintiff had met the threshold 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309 (1) and having made 
its Minute Entry on July 1, 1993 , based upon the Special Verdict of 
the jury and the Minute Entry of the Court, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The plaintiff Khai Chanhmany was not negligent• 
2. The defendant Joyce A. Preston was not negligent. 
3. The defendant Brian D. Bone was negligent, and his 
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the damages claimed by 
the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany. 
4. The total damages which have been incurred by Khai 
Chanhmany as a direct consequence of the negligence of Brian D. 
Bone are as follows: 
a. Past medical expenses $2,100.00 
b. Past wage loss 101.00 
TOTAL $2,201.00 
5. Even though the jury in its Special Verdict found 
general damages in favor of the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany in the sum 
of $3,000.00, in accordance with the Minute Entry of the Court 
dated July 1, 1993, the Court specifically finds that she is not 
entitled to general damages in this matter because she failed to 
meet the threshold requirements of § 31A-22-309(1) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). Due to the fact that Plaintiff 
failed to prove that she had met the $3,000.00 threshold for 
medical expenses as required by Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-
309(1)(e) (1953, as amended) and further that Plaintiff failed to 
prove that she had suffered a permanent disability in accordance 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT, postage prepaid, this 
J^day of July, 1993, to the following: 
Edward T. Wells 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Wendell E. Bennett 
Attorney for Defendant Preston 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
TMP:lr^/92-152.43 
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ADDENDUM 4 
EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY CHANHMANY, et al., | 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOYCE A. PRESTON, et al., 
Defendant. 
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT 
JOYCE PRESTON'S JUDGMENT ON 
I SPECIAL VERDICT 
| Civil NO. 910907726PI 
I Judge John A. Rokich 
Plaintiff Khai Chanhmany, through counsel Edward T. 
Wells, hereby objects to Defendant Joyce Preston's Judgment on 
Special Verdict as follows: 
Plaintiff objects to paragraph 5 on the grounds that 
plaintiff does meet the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann, § 
31A-22-309(1)(c) and (e). The undisputed trial testimony was that 
plaintiff has a permanent impairment of at least 6.8%. 
Plaintiff incurred over $3,000 in medical bills as well. 
The jury in its discretion did not award the full amount of the 
bills despite the undisputed testimony that the injuries she was 
being treated for were related to the accident from which this 
lawsuit arose. 
Plaintiff also objects to paragraph 7 in that the jury in 
its discretion did not attribute any negligence on the part of 
Joyce Preston. Brian Bone was found 100% at fault. Therefore, all 
costs should be paid by Defendant Brian Bone. 
DATED this / V day of May, 1993. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the 
foregoing OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT JOYCE PRESTON'S JUDGMENT ON 
SPECIAL VERDICT (Chanhmany v. Preston) were mailed, postage 
prepaid, this /f day of May, 1993 to the following: 
Wendell E. Bennett 
448 East 400 South, #304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Terry M. Plant 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
c 
4148-037\vah 
TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Bone 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180) 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY CHANHMANY, a minor, by and ) 
through his natural mother and j 
guardian, KHAI CHANHMANY, and ] 
KHAI CHANHMANY, individually, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOYCE A. PRESTON and BRIAN D. 
BONE, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
OF OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
| Civil No. 910907726PI | Judge John A. Rokich 
The defendant, Brian D. Bone, submits the following 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of his objection to 
Plaintiff's judgment on the verdict. 
In her judgment on the verdict submitted to this 
defendant on May 12, 1993, a copy of which is attached hereto for 
the convenience of the Court, Plaintiff properly sets forth the 
answers to the special interrogatories answered by the jury. 
Special Interrogatory No. 6 contains the damages portion of the 
jury verdict. In awarding damages, the jury awarded past medical 
expense to the plaintiff in the amount of $2,100.00. A general 
dcflnage award was given for $3,000.00. 
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309 sets forth as follows: 
(1) A person who has or is required to have 
direct benefit coverage under a policy 
which includes Personal Injury Protection 
may not maintain a cause of action for 
general damages arising out of personal 
injuries alleged to have been caused by 
an accident, except where the person has 
sustained one or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of 
$3,000. 
Due to the fact that the plaintiff has failed to meet any 
of the threshold requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309, 
in accordance with the language of that statute she is not entitled 
to any general damage award. There are a number of "thresholds" 
set forth under § 31A-22-309 which will allow a party to meet the 
requirements of the statute. Given the jury's verdict, she did not 
meet the medical expense threshold and there was no evidence 
presented to the jury regarding any of the remaining thresholds. 
The plaintiff obviously is not dead and has sustained no 
dismemberment or permanent disfigurement of any kind as a result of 
the accident. As to the permanent disability threshold, while 
there was evidence discussed at the trial concerning "impairment", 
there was no evidence whatsoever offered concerning disability and 
particularly no medical testimony or other appropriate testimony to 
establish that the plaintiff had sustained permanent disability. 
As the Court is aware, there is a distinct difference between 
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impairment and disability, and in order for the plaintiff to 
sustain her burden of meeting the threshold requirements, he must 
establish that she is not only impaired, but disabled in some way. 
There was virtually no evidence offered in this trial regarding 
disability. Further, given the low amount of general damages 
awarded, the Court can and should rule as a matter of law that the 
jury found no permanent injury of any kind. However, even if the 
Court does believe there may be an issue concerning a permanent 
impairment, since the plaintiff failed to put on any evidence of a 
"disability" and further given the amount of the jury verdict for 
general damages, the Court should rule as a matter of law that 
there was no permanent disability established and therefore should 
likewise rule that the plaintiff has failed to meet the threshold 
requirements of § 31A-22-309. 
As a result of the foregoing, the defendant Brian Bone 
prays that the award of $3,000.00 for general damages be stricken 
and that the plaintiff recover only her special damages, which 
would include past medical expense and past wage loss, but be given 
no award for general damages. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of May, 1993. 
HANS<S3, EPPERSON & SMITH 
T^RYyk. JPLftNT 
AttorneV^for Defendant Bone 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT, postage prepaid, 
this /(/fcLav of May, 1993, to the following: 
Edward T. Wells 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Wendell E. Bennett 
Attorney for Defendant Preston 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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